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Abstract:  The responsiveness of dogs to humans encourages us to attribute human-like emotions 
to them. Indirect evidence for emotions in other animals can be obtained but one must be careful 
to find means of distinguishing what we believe to be evidence for such emotions from simpler 
mechanisms. For example, is a dog’s growl an indication of anger, fear, or possibly an unemotional 
defense of territory? By carefully designing experiments, we may be able to rule out alternative 
accounts and show better evidence for underlying emotions. 
 
 
Thomas R. Zentall is the DiSilvestro 
Endowed Professor of Arts and Sciences 
and is a University Research Professor in 
the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY. With 
Edward Wasserman, he has edited 
Comparative Cognition: Experimental 
Explorations of Animal Intelligence (Oxford 
University Press) and The Oxford Handbook 




In her target article, Kujala (2017) presents a well-written and well-balanced discussion of the 
study of animal emotions focusing primarily on the emotions of dogs. On the one hand, she cites 
behavioral studies that interpret the behavior of dogs under conditions that would often elicit 
certain emotions in humans (e.g., happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger). On the other hand, 
she cites brain scan studies suggesting that under similar conditions, activity in the dogs’ brain 
occurs in brain areas analogous to those of humans. The convergence of behavioral and brain 
data lends credibility to the possibility that the emotions may be similar as well. But as Kujala 
acknowledges, there is a strong tendency for humans to anthropomorphize about living and even 
nonliving things, so we must be careful to guard against attributing human emotions to animals 
when their behavior appears to us to indicate a similar emotion.  
 If one is interested in studying emotions in animals, dogs should provide a good model 
because not only are they naturally a highly social species, but through artificial selection over 
thousands of years they have become domesticated and integrated into our social network. Yet 
that also makes us more vulnerable to over-interpreting their behavior. Consider a dog’s growl. 
Most people would interpret it as an indication of anger, but others may interpret it as an 
indication of fear, a quite different emotion, and still others may interpret it as a territorial display 
that may have little emotional content but simply be a signal to indicate “this is my territory.” 




Secondary emotions are even more difficult to identify. Research on “guilt” described by 
Kujala is a good example. Although many pet owners claim that their dogs show signs of guilt, if 
they have engaged in forbidden behavior while the owner was away, Horowitz (2009) found that 
behavior, commonly thought to be a sign of “guilt,” was evident when the guardians scolded their 
dog, regardless of whether the dog had disobeyed. This suggests that the dogs respond to the 
guardian’s behavior rather than feeling guilt, due to remorse, based on their own behavior. 
Another example of presumed secondary emotions described by Kujala is inequality 
aversion or having a sense of “fairness.” When Range, Horn, Viranyi, and Huber (2009) trained 
dogs to present their paw on command, they did so less often when a partner dog was rewarded 
but they were not, than in an asocial condition when they were not rewarded. In such research it 
is important to rule out other possible explanations. One alternative is that when the partner was 
rewarded, a reward was present but not provided to the target dog. Would the target dog have 
done the same if, in the asocial condition, a reward was visible but not given to the dog when the 
paw was given?  
In support of this alternative account, when monkeys that had been trained to exchange 
a stone for a low-valued reward saw a partner receiving a high-valued reward for performing the 
same action, they sometimes rejected the low-valued reward (Brosnan & De Waal, 2003). 
However, when the same high-valued reward was placed in the adjoining cage without a 
conspecific partner, the target monkeys rejected the low-valued reward to a similar degree. 
Hence it is not necessary to posit that the monkey had a sense of fairness. Instead, the difference 
between the high-valued reward expected and the low-valued reward received could account for 
the monkeys’ behavior. In the case of the dogs studied by Range et al.  (2009), seeing the reward 
(whether given to the partner or not) may have been sufficient to reduce the likelihood of 
performing the requested behavior. In fairness to Kujala, she does mention that future research 
is needed to determine the role of other factors and expectation violation was one of the factors 
identified. 
Kujala does a nice job of parsing the concept of empathy as an emotion in humans, noting 
differences among emotional empathy, cognitive empathy, and the separation of the self-from-
the-other. She notes that emotional empathy can be further divided into emotional 
contagion/self-distress and empathic concern. It is the latter difference that is critical to the 
attribution of the emotion. If dogs are thought to have a sense of empathy, it implies that they 
are concerned for the welfare of others and not merely that it relieves their own distress. To 
illustrate this difference, Lucke and Batson (1980), studying altruism in rats, included appropriate 
controls and found that the rats responded to the distress of other rats primarily to relieve their 
own distress. In more recent research, Bartal, Decety, and Mason (2011) found that rats would 
release a trapped conspecific from a tube, but they failed to consider the possibility that the 
“altruist” was motivated by affiliation with the trapped rat rather the desire to relieve the 
presumed distress of the other rat.  
In research on altruism, it is important to ensure that the presumed altruist “understands” 
the nature of its behavior. For example, Kujala cites Quervel-Chaumette et al. (2015) who trained 
dogs to pull a rope attached to a tray to deliver food to an adjacent enclosure to which they could 
gain access. When the adjacent enclosure contained a familiar dog, they pulled the rope more 
than when the adjacent enclosure contained an unfamiliar dog. First, did the donor dog 
“understand” that they would not receive the delivered food itself? Second, could the presence 




of the unfamiliar dog in the adjacent enclosure inhibit pulling because of fear or reluctance to 
compete with the unfamiliar dog? In considering a process, like an emotion, that is difficult to 
assess directly, one must be careful to consider other simpler mechanisms.  
The possibility of simpler alternative accounts is of particular concern when evaluating 
research mentioned by Kujala on the phenomenon known as the “cognitive judgement bias.” This 
bias is purported to allow one to distinguish between whether an animal is optimistic or 
pessimistic. To test for an animal’s bias, one might first train them to discriminate between a 
location that has a bowl with food and a location with one that does not (Mendl et al., 2010). 
Then one places a bowl at a location between the two training locations and assesses the time to 
approach the novel bowl location. If the dog approaches the test bowl quickly, it is judged to be 
optimistic. If they approach the test bowl slowly, they are judged to be pessimistic. The results of 
such a test are interesting. The problem with this test is the interpretation given to the results. 
Optimism and pessimism are emotions that relate to the expectation of specific future events, 
finding the bowl with or without food. It is possible, however, that differences in the latency of 
approach to the bowl in a novel location reflects individual differences in the dogs’ fear of novelty. 
Kujala does note that inducing positive or negative expectations experimentally has proven tricky, 
but she does not suggest that the presumed emotions may be based on simpler mechanisms. 
Many years ago, Morgan (1894) proposed that "In no case is an animal activity to be 
interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of 
processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development." The 
application of Morgan’s Canon to research on comparative cognition is not intended as insistence 
on a simplistic interpretation of all behavior; it is intended to inquire whether the cognitive 
interpretation is necessary. When used appropriately, it is meant to encourage researchers to 
think of simpler explanations and by so doing, to consider how one would test the hypothesis that 
the simpler explanation is not adequate to account for the observed results. The process of ruling 
out alternative explanations for behavior is especially difficult when attempting to assess the 
emotions of an animal, but if we are to progress in our understanding of animal behavior, it is 
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